IntelNomics
Competitive Intelligence & Perception's Management
terça-feira, 27 de fevereiro de 2024
Portugal: Falta de Estratégia e de Decisão
Estamos a poucos dias de celebrar os 50 anos de Abril. Porém, Portugal é muito menos do que podia e devia ser. Os 123 mil milhões de euros, do OE de 2024, em impostos e contribuições, serão aplicados em nosso nome, a bem de todos mas com que objectivos? Que país seremos daqui a 10 anos?
Há dias (20 de Fevereiro) foi assinado em Antuérpia uma Declaração sobre o(s) novo(s) desafio(s) da Indústria na UE (antwerp-declaration.eu). O que disso pensa o futuro primeiro-ministro? Os nossos media, nada disseram sobre essa Declaração. Estamos virados para dentro, para a pequena política, para o curtíssimo prazo. E a verdade é que não observamos nem estudamos quase nada do complexo quadro geopolítico. Os 45 mil milhões do PRR para que servem? Alguém discute, alguém debate?
Uma cegueira estratégica que nos custará caro. Até quando? Não esquecer que alguns foram lestos e rápidos a prescindir dos centros de decisão nacionais, pelo que o nosso futuro, como país, as nossas prioridades, no investimento e ordenamento do território, passam mais pela Vinci e pela Fosun do que pelo voto dos portugueses.
A terceira travessia do Tejo e o novo Aeroporto passam mais pela decisão em Paris, do que pelo Terreiro do Paço. Aqui ao lado, o reforço no capital da Telefónica pela Saudi Telecom, teve resposta no dia seguinte, pelo Estado Espanhol, que reforçou a sua posição de maior accionista da operadora. E nós?
Bem, por cá, os partidos apostam em demandas ideológicas maximalistas e extremistas e na pequena trica política, adiando a discussão dos grandes desafios que se colocam ao país.
Os políticos de hoje revelam pouca cultura e muito escassa preparação para governar Portugal. Não arriscam uma ideia e não têm nenhuma visão de futuro. Assim, se este quadro não mudar, seremos ultrapassados por quem percebe o elementar: planear o futuro e assegurar o presente.
Bem sabemos que agora o país espera pelo dia 10 de Março. Mas será muito triste perceber que pouco ou nada mudará, se não se quebrarem as viseiras ideológicas extremistas que comprometem a estabilidade e o consenso necessários para enfrentar as ameaças e abrir o caminho às oportunidades deste Portugal Atlântico e arquipelágico, abençoado pelo mar.
É urgente combinar as capacidades dos vectores militares e económicos, com uso dual, que a mediocridade política ignora.
O actual quadro geopolítico é um grande desafio, mas sobretudo para quem tem a obrigação de proporcionar a criação de riqueza e o progresso para aumentar o rendimento dos portugueses e garantir o futuro dos jovens em Portugal que muito deles precisa, em todos os sectores: na política, na economia, nas ciências e na cultura.
terça-feira, 20 de fevereiro de 2024
China | Li Qiang, um primeiro-ministro em maus lençóis
quarta-feira, 14 de fevereiro de 2024
Express: O director do jornal era um espião do KGB
Honra seja feita ao jornal que tomou a iniciativa de investigar e revelar esta sua história. Uma coisa nunca vista noutros países em que Mitrokhine também revela e identifica directores de jornais (e jornalistas...) como agentes do KGB. Em Portugal, por exemplo, onde um importante "jornalista" até em Belém terá exercido os seus talentos, por conta da Lubyanka ...
https://www.lexpress.fr/societe/le-directeur-de-lexpress-etait-un-agent-du-kgb-nos-revelations-sur-philippe-grumbach-5A6YO56MZRBLTC67C4KC3RAMGI/
segunda-feira, 22 de janeiro de 2024
Estado-Civilização versus Estado-Nação, o grande afrontamento do séc.XXI
Le XXIe siècle, âge des États civilisations?
par Florian Louis | Conflits | 4 Nov. 2019
À en croire les voix de plus en plus nombreuses qui l’affirment, un nouveau type de réalité étatique, l’État civilisation, aurait vu le jour au cours des dernières décennies et se répandrait progressivement par le monde. Forme politique originale dont les incarnations paradigmatiques seraient la Chine et la Russie, l’État civilisation est présenté par ses promoteurs comme étant appelé à prendre inéluctablement le dessus sur le modèle occidental de l’État nation qui serait arrivé à péremption.
Popularisée en 2009 sous la plume du chercheur de la London School of Economics (LSE) Martin Jacques, reprise à son compte en 2012 par le spécialiste chinois de Relations internationales Zhang Weiwei, la notion d’État-civilisation est vite devenue à la mode au point d’être reprise à son compte par le président Poutine en personne lors d’une intervention devant le club Valdaï en 2013.
La civilisation contre la nation
Alors qu’une même civilisation, à l’image de l’Europe par exemple, peut compter en son sein plusieurs nations ayant chacune donné lieu à une incarnation étatique distincte (la France, l’Allemagne, l’Italie, etc.), un État civilisation ou État civilisationnel a la prétention, plus ou moins réalisée dans les faits, de présider seul aux destinées de l’ensemble d’une aire civilisationnelle: ce serait par excellence le cas de la Chine ou de la Russie, deux États qui ne seraient pas seulement les émanations de deux nations, mais de deux civilisations, cette dernière réalité étant perçue comme supérieure à la première du fait de sa plus grande profondeur historique.
La nation serait en effet une construction relativement récente et donc fragile qui tenterait d’amalgamer avec des bonheurs divers des populations porteuses de substrats civilisationnels potentiellement hétérogènes. La civilisation serait au contraire une réalité immémoriale transmise inlassablement d’une génération à l’autre depuis la nuit des temps. Chine et Russie auraient en commun d’avoir toutes deux, au XIXe siècle, tenté d’imiter l’Occident pour le rattraper. Pour ce faire, elles auraient importé à leurs dépens un modèle national qui s’est avéré inadapté à leurs spécificités civilisationnelles et ce faisant néfaste à leur épanouissement.
C’est en renonçant à ce modèle castrateur et en renouant avec leur héritage civilisationnel propre, donc en affirmant leurs différences avec l’Occident et ses valeurs sans chercher à s’en excuser ou à s’en justifier, qu’elles regagneraient aujourd’hui en vigueur au point de pouvoir désormais rivaliser avec lui.
Cette leçon aurait notamment été retenue au Moyen-Orient où la prétention à ériger par la force un «État islamique» témoignerait selon le politiste britannique de la LSE Christopher Coker d’une tentative d’avènement d’un État civilisation arabo-musulman dans une région du monde historiquement fragmentée et affaiblie par les rivalités entre des projets nationaux concurrents qui brideraient sa force civilisationnelle intrinsèque.
Une conception identitaire de l’État
Penser l’État au prisme de la civilisation plutôt qu’à travers celui de la nation a d’abord des conséquences au niveau intra-étatique. Cela suppose en effet que les citoyens dudit État qui n’en partagent pas le substrat civilisationnel se trouvent relégués dans une position subalterne dans leur propre pays, ce dont le modèle national réputé plus intégrateur était censé les prémunir. Ainsi, tandis que le parti du Congrès de Gandhi et Nehru, tenant d’une conception nationale de l’Inde, insistait sur l’égale citoyenneté des Indiens de toutes confessions, le BJP de Modi, adepte d’une conception plus strictement civilisationnelle de l’indianité, cherche à réduire les manifestations de tout ce qui est perçu par lui comme étranger à celle-ci, à commencer par l’islam.
La fin de l’universalisme libéral
Sur le plan global, l’affirmation d’États civilisations a pour principale conséquence de discréditer toute prétention à imposer des normes ou des valeurs universelles, chaque État civilisation pouvant se targuer d’avoir ses propres normes et valeurs conformes à son héritage civilisationnel. En conséquence, les tentatives occidentales d’imposer des standards à valeur universelle sont perçues et dénoncées comme des formes inacceptables d’impérialisme civilisationnel.
L’État civilisation aboutit donc à une attitude relativiste qui modifie en profondeur les rapports interétatiques. Ainsi que le résume le politologue allemand Adrian Pabst, «il est en passe de transmuer la géopolitique de l’après-guerre froide d’un universalisme libéral en un exceptionnalisme culturel»[2].
L’État civilisation est-il soluble dans l’Occident?
Originellement pensé et incarné par des pays non-Occidentaux désireux de contester l’hégémonie politique et culturelle de l’Occident, l’État civilisation serait à présent en train de s’imposer au cœur même de l’Occident par le biais des théoriciens de la nouvelle droite américaine comme Steve Bannon.
C’est en tout cas la thèse défendue par le chroniqueur du Financial Times Gideon Rachman pour qui l’éphémère conseiller stratégique de Donald Trump aurait converti son mentor à une conception civilisationnelle de l’État en tournant le dos au traditionnel universalisme états-unien. Au lieu de se poser comme ses prédécesseurs en héraut de la civilisation, l’actuel locataire de la Maison-Blanche se voudrait plus modestement le défenseur d’une civilisation occidentale menacée jusque dans son berceau par des flux migratoires mettant en péril son intégrité identitaire.
Cette conversion de l’Occident au modèle de l’État civilisation, que ses promoteurs présentent comme sa planche de salut, est au contraire analysée par Gideon Rachman comme un symptôme de sa faiblesse et de son déclin.
Alors que jadis, les pays non-occidentaux imitaient l’Occident en adoptant son modèle de l’État nation, ce serait aujourd’hui l’Occident qui irait chercher chez les autres le modèle politique de l’État civilisation pour tenter de sauver ce qui peut l’être de sa grandeur passée. C’est pourquoi Rachman affirme que «l’adhésion de Trump à une vision «civilisationnelle» du monde est un symptôme du déclin de l’Occident» car celui-ci ne se penserait plus suffisamment fort pour défendre l’universalité de son modèle[3].
La revanche de Huntington
Même si elles ne s’y réfèrent pas toujours explicitement, les théories de l’État civilisation doivent beaucoup au paradigme huntingtonien du «choc des civilisations».
Rappelons que pour Samuel Huntington (1927-2008), l’ordre mondial de l’après Guerre froide allait demeurer conflictuel, mais les facteurs de conflictualité étaient appelés à évoluer.
Ce ne serait plus pour la défense d’idéologies (le communisme ou le capitalisme par exemple) qu’on s’affronterait, mais au nom d’appartenances civilisationnelles antagoniques: «la rivalité entre superpuissances est remplacée par le choc des civilisations» écrivait-il.
Pour décrire ce choc potentiel, Huntington proposait un découpage de l’espace mondial en six à neuf civilisations appelées, si un dialogue constructif et respectueux des particularités de chacune, n’était pas instauré entre elles, à s’entrechoquer violemment.
Christopher Coker, tout en rendant hommage à Huntington et en dénonçant les (non-)lectures caricaturales qui en furent par trop souvent faites, pointe néanmoins le fait qu’il aurait «échoué à anticiper l’émergence d’une unité politique inédite: l’État civilisation et le défi qu’il pose à l’ordre international actuel».
Coker reconnaît donc à Huntington le mérite d’avoir saisi avant tout le monde l’importance croissante qu’était appelé à prendre le fait civilisationnel dans les relations internationales, mais d’avoir échoué à anticiper la capacité des États à se l’approprier, tant et si bien qu’en lieu et place d’un choc des civilisations, c’est un choc des États civilisations qu’il faudrait aujourd’hui redouter.
États nodaux et État civilisation
La critique me semble peu pertinente dans la mesure où elle fait fi de l’importance qu’accorde Huntington aux «États nodaux»[4], ainsi qu’il qualifie les entités politiques dominant chacune des différentes civilisations et qui ne sont pas sans préfigurer ce que l’on désigne aujourd’hui par l’expression «États civilisations».
Ainsi, Huntington prédisait-il qu’au XXIe siècle, «l’idée de communauté globale» était appelée à devenir «un rêve lointain» et qu’à la place de l’ordre bipolaire de la guerre froide, allait s’imposer «un monde dans lequel les États nodaux jouent un rôle directeur» et qui ne pourrait être qu’un «monde fait de sphères d’influence».
L’essor de ces États nodaux ou civilisationnels était perçu positivement par Huntington, non seulement parce qu’en se partageant le monde en sphères d’influences réciproques, il pouvait conduire à un apaisement des relations internationales, mais aussi parce que leur absence est généralement source de troubles intracivilisationnels.
La forte instabilité politique du monde musulman était ainsi interprétée par Huntington comme la conséquence de l’absence d’un État nodal fort apte d’une part à le stabiliser et d’autre part à pacifier ses relations avec les autres aires civilisationnelles en dialoguant d’égal à égal avec les États nodaux incarnant chacune d’entre elles.
Une désoccidentalisation du monde en trompe-l’œil
Si la diffusion du modèle de l’État civilisation jusque dans le monde occidental lui-même est présentée par Rachman comme un symptôme du déclin de ce dernier, c’est on l’a vu parce qu’il s’opposerait au modèle de l’État nation qui serait son invention.
Continua aqui: https://www.revueconflits.com/etat-europe-mondialisation/
A equipa Intelnomics pouco aqui publicou nestas últimas agitadas semanas que preferiu dedicar a viagens de estudo, encontros, conferências e outros trabalhos.
Agora, neste momento de regresso à publicação, uma coisa resulta bem clara: o mundo que encontramos hoje é muito diferente daquele que tínhamos em meados de Setembro passado quando iniciámos estas semanas sabáticas. Tanto no país que somos como no seu contexto global. Este novo "mundo" é a nossa prioridade nesta estranha 'rentrée'.
sexta-feira, 17 de novembro de 2023
Samuel Huntington, afinal, parece ser este o nome do profeta do nosso tempo
"In 1993, Huntington ( Harvard professor and director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs) provoked great debate among international relations theorists with the interrogatively titled "The Clash of Civilizations?", an influential, oft-cited article published in Foreign Affairs magazine. In the article, he argued that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Islam would become the biggest obstacle to Western domination of the world. The West's next big war therefore, he said, would inevitably be with Islam. Its description of post-Cold War geopolitics and the "inevitability of instability" contrasted with the influential "End of History" thesis advocated by Francis Fukuyama.
segunda-feira, 18 de setembro de 2023
China: Um Verão Muito Quente
O "caso Qin Gang" rebentou nos finais de Julho quando o ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros de Pequim desapareceu. Agora, ainda antes do fim do Verão, tocou a vez ao ministro da Defesa, General Li Shangfu (na cadeira desde Março). E assim se confirmou o que em Julho tinha escrito:
"O 'caso Qin Gang' de que aqui demos conta, na semana passada, há portanto meia-dúzia de dias, é a notícia desta tarde do dia 25 Julho, terça-feira, nos media mainstream, aqueles que apenas podem dar as notícias de ontem pois não têm nem alcançam 'a inteligência do amanhã'... Vénia aos nossos amigos do intelNomics e do Intelligence on Line.
"Xi, 'o príncipe vermelho', reconhece assim o insucesso da sua política externa. Para que tal aconteça, o fracasso tem mesmo de ser muito grave..."
domingo, 20 de agosto de 2023
A alta hierarquia militar francesa prepara os espíritos para a possibilidade de guerra generalizada na Europa, diz o Figaro.
"Estes últimos anos têm trazido o trágico de volta às nossas vidas e questionado o destino de nossa nação. Face a uma história que se endurece e acelera, perante os desafios históricos de um mundo onde a competição e o confronto estratégico se fundem, é chegado o momento de uma mobilização mais integral para melhor nos armarmos, de aumentar a independência e a força da nossa Nação no novo contexto estratégico que vivemos."
terça-feira, 1 de agosto de 2023
Uma Leitura Indispensável: Chinese Communist Espionage - An Intelligence Primer
"This is the first book of its kind to employ hundreds of Chinese sources to explain the history and current state of Chinese Communist intelligence operations. It profiles the leaders, top spies, and important operations in the history of China's espionage organs, and links to an extensive online glossary of Chinese language intelligence and security terms. Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil present an unprecedented look into the murky world of Chinese espionage both past and present, enabling a better understanding of how pervasive and important its influence is, both in China and abroad."
quarta-feira, 26 de julho de 2023
O Relatório do FMI Não Traz Boas Notícias
FMI: The global recovery is slowing amid widening divergences among economic sectors and regions
Global growth is projected to fall from an estimated 3.5 percent in 2022 to 3.0 percent in both 2023 and 2024. While the forecast for 2023 is modestly higher than predicted in the April 2023 World Economic Outlook (WEO), it remains weak by historical standards.
The recent resolution of the US debt ceiling standoff and, earlier this year, strong action by authorities to contain turbulence in US and Swiss banking reduced the immediate risks of financial sector turmoil. This moderated adverse risks to the outlook. However, the balance of risks to global growth remains tilted to the downside.
Inflation could remain high and even rise if further shocks occur, including those from an intensification of the war in Ukraine and extreme weather-related events, triggering more restrictive monetary policy. Financial sector turbulence could resume as markets adjust to further policy tightening by central banks.
In most economies, the priority remains achieving sustained disinflation while ensuring financial stability. Therefore, central banks should remain focused on restoring price stability and strengthen financial supervision and risk monitoring.
Should market strains materialize, countries should provide liquidity promptly while mitigating the possibility of moral hazard. They should also build fiscal buffers, with the composition of fiscal adjustment ensuring targeted support for the most vulnerable. Improvements to the supply side of the economy would facilitate fiscal consolidation and a smoother decline of inflation toward target levels.
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/07/10/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2023
quinta-feira, 20 de julho de 2023
China: O Caso do Ministro Desaparecido...
terça-feira, 11 de julho de 2023
A Itália a fugir das Novas Rotas da Seda e a China a tentar prendê-la!
Um processo seguido de muito perto pelo Intelligence on Line
China lobbies to keep Italy in Silk Roadquinta-feira, 6 de julho de 2023
Cuba na Nova Guerra Fria China vs. USA
Do nosso amigo Giuseppe Gagliano, sobre os avanços chineses, a passos bem largos, numa nova guerra fria.
A China investiu pesadamente em instalações de espionagem em Cuba e negociou um acordo para treinar soldados chineses na ilha ...
terça-feira, 27 de junho de 2023
Russia: Atrás de Prigozhin, " A Ordem da República"
Terá Putin, numa manipulação clássica (cujas técnicas ele domina muito bem) usado o seu "amigo" Prigozhin para levar a "Ordem da República" a pôr a cabeça de fora...?
sábado, 24 de junho de 2023
Golpe na Rússia...?
Conflicting reports don’t shed much light on the supposed coup underway.
By Geopolitical Futures | June 23, 2023 | 01 : 55Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of Russia’s private military firm known as the Wagner Group, has accused the Russian military of attacking his forces and said he would answer with attacks of his own. Conflicting reports on social media suggest Russian military vehicles are on the streets of major Russian cities in anticipation of what Russia’s attorney general has called an “attempt to organize an armed rebellion.”
Berlim Revela a Sua Primeira "Estratégia de Segurança Nacional" Pós-II Guerra
Germany's first National Security Strategy
"On 14 June, the German government released the country’s first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS).
"The NSS is fundamentally a compromise between a three-party coalition government. Consequently, some long-overdue reforms that would have enabled more coherent German national-security strategy-making fell victim to political bargaining during the 15-month drafting process led by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Alliance 90/The Greens). Most prominently, a national-security council mirroring that of other countries and meant to coordinate better and faster responses to complex security challenges did not survive disagreements between the chancellor and foreign minister over where to house such a body and who would control it. This outcome risks frustrating the NSS’s key stated purpose of ‘integrated security’. In addition, Finance Minister Christian Lindner (Free Democratic Party) insisted on making the NSS a cost-neutral exercise, which is likely to lead to disputes between ministries going forward.
Political compromise tends to produce vague and intentionally imprecise language, and this is a characteristic of the NSS. It states that in broad terms the world’s external-security environment is ‘marked by rising systemic rivalry’ and, more specifically, that ‘today’s Russia is for now the most significant threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area’. The modifiers ‘today’ and ‘for now’, however, imply that Berlin perceives Russia as only a temporary threat. This idea sits uneasily with most Eastern and Northern European allies, whose strategic trust Germany seeks to regain and who see Russia as a long-term threat.
On China, the NSS reflects a compromise between Scholz’s conciliatory stance and Baerbock’s more hawkish approach. It names China as a ‘partner, competitor and systemic rival’ and notes that competition has ‘increased in the past years’. It further identifies China’s more assertive behaviour regionally and internationally, but also clings to the notion that ‘China remains a partner without whom many global challenges and crises cannot be resolved’. The reason for such optimism is unclear, since Beijing has weaponised climate-change issues and remains unwilling to sever its strategic ties with Russia.
Moreover, the NSS fails to mention Germany’s key interest in Taiwan Strait stability, a wasted opportunity to demonstrate to the US and Indo-Pacific partners (and China) that Berlin is seriously concerned about the possibility of a conflict that would have devastating consequences for Germany and Europe. There is also no reference to growing Sino-Russian ties, which are fast becoming a security concern for many European and Indo-Pacific countries alike. ..... "
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/06/germanys-first-ever-national-security-strategy/
segunda-feira, 12 de junho de 2023
O Campeão Europeu ou... a Geopolítica da Bola
sábado, 10 de junho de 2023
Lições da Guerra na Ucrânia
Estes longos meses de guerra na Ucrânia (na Europa...) trazem algo de novo, no tabuleiro da estratégia ou no campo de batalha? Alain Bauer considera que sim e aponta o que mudou e as urgências que tais mudanças implicam, já.
quarta-feira, 31 de maio de 2023
Rússia, Churchill, Da Vinci, Monalisa, Putin... Enigmas, Mistérios e Segredos
sexta-feira, 19 de maio de 2023
Nova Guerra Fria abre Era de Geoeconomia
Geopolitics is reshaping the global economy, and will do some for the foreseeable future. We have indeed entered an era of “geo-economics.”
The growing geopolitical tensions between China, The United States and Europe have given rise to a whole new vocabulary: National security, decoupling, de-risking, onshoring, friend-shoring, near-shoring, and Cold War II are now the talk of the town...
Depending how the balance of national security and economy is struck in the end, the damage can be considerable, and even catastrophic.
Not your grandfather’s cold war
A new cold war, if it ends that way, will be very different from the last one. The Soviet Union and its COMECON allies hardly had any interaction with the west, and even that was focused on commodities, such as the grain-for-oil deals between the USSR and the United States. Trade with the USSR never amounted to more than 2 percent of the OECD’s total trade.
In contrast, China today is a key note in global supply chains, supplies some 20 percent of imports of advanced economies, and is increasingly a supplier of intermediaries to other countries, notably in South East Asia. This means that global supply chains increasingly depend on inputs from China, from rare earths to batteries to machine tools.
Furthermore, China is becoming more and more a source new technologies, innovation and ideas, produced by the millions of STEM students graduating every year, and the hundreds of thousands of PhDs, many of them studying and working at universities in the west. In peaceful times, this is a source of great benefits to the world, but in times of tension it is seen as a worrisome gain in capacity of a potential adversary.
The end of the first cold war also meant a large “peace dividend” of reduced spending on the military. According to numbers of Stockholm-based SIPRI, military spending as a share of global GDP fell from 6 percent of global output in the 1960s at the peak of the cold war to 2.1 percent in 20221. The same national security concerns that are reshaping global value chains could lead to increased military spending. (.....)
All of this still leaves aside a possible upturn in military spending. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many European NATO members are now considering upping their spending to the NATO norm of 2 percent of GDP, and in addition, Germany has announced a special allocation of EUR100bn. to refurbish their military. Japan has committed to increase its spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, an increase of 60 percent. World military spending overall grew by 3.7 percent in real terms in 2022, the highest level ever recorded by SIPRI, which has numbers dating back to 1949.
Irrespective how long green lists are, or how small the yards with high fences without a restoration of some level of trust between the US and Europe on the one hand, and China on the other, as I argued almost 3 years ago. If a country cannot be certain of supplies of critical goods from one country, it will seek to diversify away from the most efficient supplier, and choose an ally to supply it, or reshore production altogether, irrespective of the efficiency losses. If a country cannot be assured of access to critical technologies, it will choose to invent it itself, irrespective of the duplication involved.
Strategic Trust as Vivian Balakrishnan called it recently in a speech at the ANU is the glue that keeps the global order from disintegrating. If a country cannot be reasonably certain that it can import the critical goods and technology it needs, that country will strive to make it itself.
This classic prisoners’ dilemma will result in a world of trade blocks, and all will be worse off than today.
https://berthofman.substack.com/p/the-economic-consequences-of-a-new
domingo, 14 de maio de 2023
Kemal Atatürk sobre a Turquia e o Islão
Kemal Atatürk , criador da Turquia moderna
sábado, 13 de maio de 2023
sexta-feira, 12 de maio de 2023
ALTA CORRUPÇÃO: Dirigentes políticos e jornalistas europeus ao serviço de Moscovo, Pequim e até de Havana
A escandaleira da "traição das elites" europeias - que vai de Primeiros-Ministros, ministros, deputados, políticos e presidentes de câmara a jornalistas - que traem os seus países e se vendem a Estados adversários pelos "trinta dinheiros"
quarta-feira, 10 de maio de 2023
Mapa Etnológico da Península (antes das invasões e guerras romanas), 200 anos antes de Cristo
Uma síntese gráfica do trabalho de investigação desenvolvido pelo saudoso geógrafo/historiador Luís Fraga da Silva.
O "Novo Consenso de Washington" ou o Enterro do Neo-Liberalismo
Trump conquistou o poder com um "Make América Great Again" que foi o toque de finados da "globalização" e da sua apologética narrativa "neo-liberal". Trump tinha sabido envergar e muito bem vender o discurso político (elaborado por Steve Bannon) que fazia o encontro entre uma emergente e nova racionalidade geopolítica e as angústias da maior minoria americana, os trabalhadores brancos ou, no dizer da senhora Clinton, os "deploráveis", também ditos em linguajar de sociólogo, os "white trash". Ninguém quis perguntar, na altura, por quem dobravam os sinos. Era mais fácil atribuir a "inesperada" vitória de Trump a uma "conspiração russa". Eleito Biden, muita gente tomou a nuvem por Juno ou os seus desejos pela realidade e "achou" que esta vitória do candidato do PD era um retorno ao pré-Trump. Enganaram-se, claro.
Joe Biden prosseguiu e desenvolveu a política MAGA de Trump mas mudando-lhe a imagem: vestiu-lhe uma roupagem sexy e estampou-lhe um sorriso na cara. Assim, continuou a fatal erosão do velho "consenso de Washinton", que vinha dos anos 80 do século passado com as suas narrativas da globalização produtora de felicidade e do neo-liberalismo produtor de racionalidade económica. A oração fúnebre foi agora rezada pelo National Security Adviser do Presidente Biden, Jake Sullivan, que, enquanto enterrava o velho "consenso", aproveitou para apresentar o novo.Franklin Foer | The Atlantic | May 10, 2023
Earlier this month, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan delivered a speech at the Brookings Institution that historically would have made for front-page material but barely registered in the world beyond wonkdom. His address was a muscular statement of ideological intent.
What Sullivan championed in the speech was something like the antithesis of that old paradigm. He said that ever-greater global interdependence is no longer desirable. One reason is China, which participates in global capitalism without fairly playing by its rules. Another is the realization, exposed by the pandemic-induced crisis in the intricate global supply chain, that the American economy is vulnerable to even small disruptions on the other side of the planet. That crisis was an indication that the world has gone too far in a libertarian direction and needs the sort of regulation and government investment that only a short while ago were highly unfashionable in the Washington policy sphere.
Although he didn’t justify his use of the term this way, he could get away with describing his views as representative of a new “consensus”: Both Trump and Biden have positioned themselves as economic nationalists, self-consciously abandoning the precepts of the old order.
That’s not to describe the Trump and Biden versions of economic nationalism as equivalent. Although Trump delivered vituperative speeches, inflected by xenophobia, about elites destroying American manufacturing, he didn’t really have any ideas about how to reverse course beyond jacking up tariffs. Biden’s national-security adviser, by contrast, put a big idea at the center of his speech. He extolled the virtues of industrial strategy: a new role for the state in directing the trajectory of the economy.
Industrial strategy begins with the premise that the national interest demands that certain industries flourish domestically. .....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/the-new-washington-consensus/ar-AA1aWvVE
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